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Merger simulation has developed rapidly within the field of industrial 
organization as an important tool to evaluate unilateral price effects of mergers involving 
differentiated goods.
1  Simulation typically calculates these effects as percentage changes 
in equilibrium prices between the pre and post merger markets, assuming the absence of 
overt collusion among competitors.  A virtually unknown area a few years ago, the FTC 
has recently termed simulation among the past decade￿s ￿remarkable developments in the 
quantitative analysis of horizontal mergers.￿
2  The appeal of simulation is that it provides 
an economically coherent framework to quantify potential unilateral price increases, 
taking into account market shares, efficiencies, and other key features of a transaction.   
In practice, simulation has to confront the significant practical constraints of the 
merger review process, including often limited amounts of data, the need to control costs, 
and regulations that often permit only a short amount of time for the evaluation of 
competitive effects.  Much research relating to merger simulation has focused on other 
complications involving the appropriate specification of demand systems, the empirical 
estimation of parameters, the assumption of static versus dynamic pricing behavior, and 
other methodological issues.
3  Given these factors, there is increasing interest in methods 
                                                 
1 For a recent review of some of the relevant literature, including references to the work 
of Werden and Froeb, Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes, and Hausman, Leonard, and Zona, 
see Baker and Rubinfeld (1999). 
2 See Issues in Econometric Analysis of Scanner Data, available at www.ftc.gov.  
3 See Pinske and Slade (2002) for a more detailed discussion.  
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to obtain values for the inputs to the analysis that can make simulation a feasible and 
persuasive option in a broader range of situations.
4   
In this article we describe a modeling strategy to achieve these goals that is 
fundamentally different from existing approaches that are based on structural 
econometric estimation.
5  Specifically, we integrate the PCAIDS (Proportionality-
Calibrated Almost Ideal Demand System) merger simulation methodology (Epstein and 
Rubinfeld (2002)) with brand-level profit margin data, data that should be available (at 
least for the parties) in an actual merger review.  Our approach uses the margin data to 
estimate the PCAIDS parameters that define ￿nests￿ (i.e., groups of products that are 
particularly close substitutes).  The nests provide a flexible and relatively parsimonious 
structure for estimating pre-merger demand elasticities that are consistent with the 
observed margins and that exactly satisfy the Bertrand first-order conditions for profit 
maximization conventionally used in merger simulation. 
Briefly, PCAIDS is an approximation to the Almost Ideal Demand System 
(AIDS) that is widely used in applied microeconomics.
7  PCAIDS relies on a generalized 
principle of proportionality to reduce greatly the number of free parameters in the 
demand model: a price increase for a single brand results in diversion of lost sales to the 
other brands in proportion to their current market shares.  In its most basic form (i.e., with 
a single nest), PCAIDS can be fully specified with two parameters: the margin for a 
single brand and the price elasticity for the market as a whole.  If the market is well 
characterized by proportionality, this specification will yield a close approximation to the 
elasticities from the unrestricted AIDS.  When the actual pattern of demand deviates from 
￿strict￿ proportionality, then the quality of the approximation can be improved by adding 
additional nests to generalize the analysis.
9  As the amount of a priori margin (or 
elasticity) information increases, PCAIDS is able to calibrate more and more nests 
                                                 
4 Werden and Froeb (2002). 
5 See, e.g., Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) in addition to Pinske and Slade (2002). 
6 Nests are clusters of brands that are particularly close substitutes.    
7 Deaton and Muellbauer (1980). 
8 In Epstein and Rubinfeld (2002) PCAIDS in this setting is equivalently parameterized 
using the price elasticity for a single brand and the market elasticity. 
9 Nests in our analysis are analogous to the different levels of a multi-stage budgeting 
model, an approach that is sometimes used to make econometric estimation tractable.    
  3
empirically.  The resulting elasticities are less constrained than those implied by strict 
proportionality and can result in a much closer approximation to a full AIDS model.  
The key to our analysis is the linkage between the ￿nesting parameters￿ in 
PCAIDS and the accounting data on profit margins.
10  We will show that in some 
circumstances the margin data are sufficient to identify the nesting parameters exactly, 
while in other cases the nesting parameters are not fully identified.  Lack of identification 
is not necessarily a serious issue because the margin data nonetheless yield bounds on the 
possible values for the nesting parameters.  In still other cases (corresponding roughly to 
a situation of many margins and relatively few nests) the nesting parameters will be 
overidentified, necessitating a further discussion of calibration strategies.  
Properly measured accounting margins hold out the prospect of more accurate 
model calibration compared to conventional econometric modeling of pre-merger own 
and cross-price elasticities.  The new approach may be particularly appealing for 
transactions at the wholesale level (where scanner data do not exist) and for geographic 
markets that span national borders (where comparable data may not be available).  The 
econometric approach is not well suited for many transactions because of a lack of 
adequate data even when strong assumptions are made about market structure (such as a 
multi-stage budgeting process) to reduce the typically large number of parameters to be 
estimated.  Even with relatively large datasets, the empirical results can be problematic, 
with wrong signs, implausible magnitudes, and low statistical reliability for the estimated 
coefficients.   
The balance of this article is organized as follows.  In Section II we set the stage 
by briefly reviewing the structure of PCAIDS with nests.  In Section III we explain how 
the accounting profit margin data can be used to infer nesting parameters empirically.  
Section IV briefly discusses some of the relevant considerations when using accounting 
data in this context.  Section V presents several examples of the analysis.  Section VI 
contains a brief conclusion. 
 
  
                                                 
10 The term ￿nesting parameter￿ will be used in place of ￿odds ratio factor￿ and ￿scaling 
factor￿ used in Epstein and Rubinfeld (2002), pp. 896, 897.  
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II.  MERGER SIMULATION WITH PCAIDS  
Merger simulation models for differentiated products typically assume that prices 
in the market can be analyzed using Bertrand assumptions.  According to this theory, the 
first-order conditions (￿FOCs￿) for profit maximization by each firm can be specified in 
terms of market shares, incremental profit margins, and price elasticities.  The market is 
assumed to be in Bertrand equilibrium both pre- and post-merger.   
There are n firms pre-merger.  The ith firm produces ni brands and there is a total 
of  N brands in the market.  A general expression for all of the FOCs for profit 
maximization is given by the matrix equation: 
  s + diag(E1, E2, …, En)Sµ = 0.   (1) 
 
In this expression, s = (s1, s2, …, sN)· is the vector of market shares (in terms of revenue) 
and S = diag(s).  The corresponding vector of brand margins is µ = (µ1, µ2, …, µN)·.  For 
the ith firm, Ei is an ni by ni matrix of transposed price elasticities with element (k, j) 
equal to εjk.  In the pre-merger equilibrium, the brands margins µ are given by  
             µ = ￿ S
￿1diag(E1, E2, …, En)
￿1s .   (2) 
 
Assume that the merger involves firms n￿1 and n.  The merged firm is 
characterized by an augmented elasticity matrix E
*
n￿1 for the nn￿1 plus nn brands it is now 
producing.  The FOCs for the post-merger market are 
  s + diag(E1, E2, …, E
*
n￿1)Sµ = 0,  (3) 
 
where all variables are understood to be taken at their post-transaction values.  Merger 
simulation consists of finding the post-merger prices that yield margins, shares, and 
elasticities that solve (3).   
The solution to equation (3) depends on the functional form of the underlying 
demand model and a supply model that determines how total cost responds to 
incremental changes in post-merger output.  The demand side can be modeled using a 
variety of specifications; the literature includes examples of linear, constant elasticity, 
and variants of logit and AIDS systems.  The supply side is generally treated as a step-
function for which incremental cost does not vary with output.  The step allows for 
possible merger-specific efficiencies, which are analyzed by changing the level of post- 
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merger incremental costs (keeping the assumption that the new level of incremental cost 
does not vary with output). 
In PCAIDS each si is a linear function of the natural logarithms of the vector of 
prices p of all of the brands in the relevant market.  Letting p be the vector of prices of 
the brands, the model can be written as  
  s = a + Bln(p)  
where a is a vector of constants and B is a matrix of coefficients (that are assumed to be 
invariant to price changes).  Unlike AIDS, PCAIDS suppresses the aggregate expenditure 
terms, i.e., the model imposes homotheticity, so that a change in total industry 
expenditure has no effects on share.
11  To proceed, differentiate each share equation 
totally to obtain: 
         ds = B(dp/p) (4) 
 
Equation (4) describes a simple relationship between the change in each brand￿s market 
share (ds) and the unilateral effects (dp/p).  The elements bij of B act as weights to 
determine the amount of share lost or gained due to unilateral effects.  Moreover, as is 
apparent from (4), knowledge of the ai terms is unnecessary.  The post-merger shares for 
use in equation (3) are given by s
post = s
pre + ds.  PCAIDS therefore is a particularly 
convenient demand model for merger simulation.   
  The post-merger own and cross-price elasticities for each brand in the market in 
general will also depend on the vector dp/p of unilateral effects.  It can be shown
12 that in 
PCAIDS:  
  Own-price elasticity for the ith brand: εii =  ) 1 ( 1 i
i
ii + + + − ε s
s
b    (5) 
  Cross-price elasticity of the ith brand with respect to the price of the jth brand:  
                     εij =   ) 1 ( j
i




Here ε is the price elasticity of demand for the market as a whole, which is typically 
assumed to remain unchanged post-merger.  Using the s
post vector in equations (5) and (6) 
yields the post-merger elasticities.   
                                                 
11 To our knowledge, the empirical AIDS models in the literature seldom indicate an 
economically important role for the expenditure term. 
12 Epstein and Rubinfeld (2002), Appendix.  
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  Finally, the solution to (3) requires updated brand profit margins.  Algebraically, 
it can be seen that for each brand, µi
post = 1 ￿ (1 ￿ µi
pre)/exp(dpi/pi).  This relationship is 
independent of the demand model.  This structure is sufficient to solve the post-merger 
FOCs entirely in terms of the predicted unilateral effects dp/p.   
A.  Calibrating PCAIDS Under Strict Proportionality 
The problem remains of finding appropriate values for the bij.  PCAIDS assumes 
that the share lost as a result of a price increase is allocated to the other firms in the 
relevant market in proportion to their respective shares.  In effect, the market shares 
define probabilities of making incremental sales for each of the competitors.  We also 
impose homogeneity on the demand model in equation (4) as an appealing theoretical 
property, i.e., ∑bik = 0 ∀k.  (Since shares must sum to 100%, the model also satisfies an 
adding-up constraint ∑bki = 0 ∀k by definition).  Homogeneity with the proportionality 
assumption implies symmetry of B, thereby satisfying Slutsky symmetry, as will be 
proved below.   
A three-brand example will illustrate the basic proportionality assumption.   
Consider a price increase dp1/p1 with all other prices unchanged.  With proportionality, 
sales are diverted to brands 2 and 3 in proportion to their market shares.  That is, ds2/ds3 = 
s2/s3.  Moreover, the sum of the changes in shares across all brands must equal zero 
(because shares must always sum to 100%).  It follows that b21 equals ￿s2/(s2+s3)b11 and 
b31 equals ￿s3/(s2+s3)b11 (the minus sign is necessary to satisfy ∑dsi = 0).  The other 
coefficients in B can be calibrated similarly, e.g., a change dp2/p2 implies b12 equals ￿
s1/(s1+s3)b22 and b32 equals ￿s3/(s1+s3)b22.  B can accordingly be expressed in this 
example as: 
                                                 
13 See Horizontal Merger Guidelines at ¶2.211. 
14 Our discussion of PCAIDS focuses on implementation with aggregate market share 
information.  However, the method is also applicable as a set of restrictions that could 
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The matrix is completely determined by the three unknown diagonal elements.   
Proportionality has dramatically reduced the calibration problem from order N
2 to order 
N.   
Homogeneity and adding-up simplify the problem even further.  Express b33 as    
￿b31￿b32 and substitute in b11 = ￿b12  ￿  b13 to find that b22=(s2/s1)(1￿s2)/(1￿s1)b11.  
Similarly,  b33=(s3/s1)(1￿s3)/(1￿s1)b11.  That is, the entire demand model under 
proportionality can be calibrated in terms of a single parameter.  (We prove below that 
this result holds regardless of the number of brands in the market.)  Assuming the own-
price elasticity ε11 is known for the first brand and that the market elasticity of demand ε 
is also known, invert equation (5) to find  
  )) 1 ( 1 ( 1 11 1 11 + − + = ε s ε s b .  
The B matrix is then determined by appropriate scaling of b11 with the market shares. 
  These ideas can be illustrated as follows.  Assume that the shares for the 3 brands 
(each sold by a different firm) are 20%, 30%, and 50%, respectively.  Now, assume that 
there is a proposed merger between firms 1 and 2, the industry elasticity is ￿1, and the 
own-price elasticity for the first brand is ￿3.  Table 1 shows the resulting B matrix and 
elasticities. 
 
Table 1  
PCAIDS Coefficients and Elasticities 
  PCAIDS Coefficient with Respect to:    Elasticity with Respect to: 
Brand  p1  p2  p3 Brand p1  p2  p3 
1 ￿0.400 0.150  0.250  1  ￿3.00  0.75  1.25 
2 0.150 ￿0.525 0.375 2  0.50  ￿2.75  1.25 
3 0.250 0.375 ￿0.625 3  0.50  0.75  ￿2.25 
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The PCAIDS coefficients satisfy adding-up and homogeneity and are symmetric, as 
required.   
Assume that the first two firms merge.  PCAIDS simulation with these parameters 
predicts a unilateral post-merger price increase (absent efficiencies) of 13.8% for Brand 1 
and 10.8% for Brand 2. 
Table 1 illustrates an important feature of strict proportionality: it constrains the 
cross-price elasticities corresponding to a given price change to be equal, although they 
may still vary substantially with respect to price increases across brands.  The ability to 
derive a large number of elasticities from a single parameter (e.g., b11) therefore comes at 
the expense of some flexibility in the model.  This constraint is the main difference 
between PCAIDS and the full, unrestricted AIDS.  It is generally of most concern when 
products are highly differentiated, since proportionality may not accurately describe the 
diversion of sales in those circumstances.
15  The purpose of nests is to relax this 
constraint and allow a closer approximation to the unrestricted AIDS. 
B.  Nests and Deviations from Strict Proportionality 
We allow a more general analysis of elasticity by grouping brands in ￿nests.￿
16  
Proportionality governs diversion within a nest, where brands are relatively close 
substitutes.  Brands are poorer substitutes across nests than indicated by proportionality, 
implying variation in the cross-price elasticities.  While εik = εjk for brands in the same 
nest, the cross-price elasticities are (relatively) lower across nests, i.e., εmk < εik.for brands 
m and i in different nests.   
To illustrate, return to the three-brand example discussed in the previous section.  
In that example, brand 2￿s market share of 30% and brand 3￿s share of 50% implied that 
                                                 
15 Cf. Horizontal Merger Guidelines at ¶2.211: ￿The market shares of the merging firms￿ 
products may understate the competitive effect of concern, when, for example, the 
products of the merging firms are relatively more similar in their various attributes to 
one another than to other products in the relevant market.  On the other hand, the 
market shares alone may overstate the competitive effects of concern when, for 
example, the relevant products are less similar in their attributes to one another than to 
other products in the relevant market.￿ 
 
16 See Werden and Froeb (1994) for a discussion of nests in the context of a logit demand 
model.    
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37.5% (30/80) of the share lost by brand 1 when its price increased would be diverted to 
brand 2 and 62.5% (50/80) would be diverted to brand 3.  This effect can be characterized 
using an odds ratio.  Here, the odds ratio between brand 2 and brand 3 is 0.6 
(0.375/0.625).  That is, under proportionality, brand 2 is only 60% as likely to be chosen 
by consumers leaving brand 1 as brand 3.  Now suppose instead that brand 2 is relatively 
￿farther￿ from brand 1 in the sense that that fewer consumers would choose brand 2 in 
response to an increase in p1 than would be predicted by proportionality.  For example, 
brand 2 may only be ￿half as desirable￿ a substitute as brand 3 and the appropriate odds 
ratio really only 0.3.  It is straightforward to calculate in this case that the share diversion 
to brand 2 becomes 23.1% and the diversion to brand 3 increases to 76.9% (an odds ratio 
of 0.3=.231/.769).  As expected, fewer consumers leaving brand 1 would choose brand 2.  
We use ￿nesting parameters￿ to generate the scaling factors that adjust diversion 
away from proportionality.  Share diverted to a brand in a different nest is adjusted in the 
following sense: the odds ratio is equal to the odds ratio under proportionality, multiplied 
by a nesting parameter on the interval (0,1].  For brands within a nest, the nesting 
parameter effectively equals 1.  The result is that brands within a nest are closer 
substitutes than brands outside the nest.  Proportionality for all brands can be thought of 
as a model with a single nest.  PCAIDS with multiple nests allows a more flexible pattern 
of cross elasticities, as the model is no longer fully constrained by the proportionality 
assumption.
17   
To characterize the nest structure in above example we place brand 2 in a separate 
nest with a nesting parameter of 0.5.  Table 2 reports the calculated elasticities for both 
the nested model and the original model.  
 
Table 2 
PCAIDS Elasticities with Nests 
  
Non-Nested Demand 
  Separate Brand 2 Nest, 
(Odds Ratio Factor = 0.5) 
  Elasticity with Respect to:    Elasticity with Respect to: 
Brand  P1  p2  p3 Brand p1  p2  p3 
                                                 
17 Given the fundamental role of nests in PCAIDS, discussions that ignore this feature of 
the model, e.g., Wu (2003), model are necessarily incomplete.   
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1  ￿3.00 0.75  1.25 1  ￿3.00 0.46  1.54 
2 0.50 ￿2.75 1.25 2 0.31 ￿2.08 0.77 
3  0.50 0.75  ￿2.25  3  0.62 0.46  ￿2.08 
 
The cross-price elasticities ε2i in the right-hand panel are scaled down by 50% 
relative to the other brands.
18  (The cross elasticities measuring the responses of brand 1 
and brand 3 to the price of brand 2 remain equal, but at lower values, because brands 1 
and 3 are in the same nest.)  In general, the nesting treats brand 2 as a poorer substitute 
for brands 1 and 3, while brands 1 and 3 become better substitutes for each other  
Simulation of a merger of brand 1 and brand 2 using this nested PCAIDS model 
predicts a unilateral price increase (without efficiencies) of 10.1% for both brand 1 and 
brand 2, compared to the original increases of 13.8% and 10.8% without nests.  The 
unilateral effects are smaller because the merging brands are less close substitutes for 
each other. 
The number of nesting parameters required in the model obviously depends on the 
number of nests.  More specifically, the number of parameters equals the number of pairs 
of nests, because each parameter modifies the share diversion between the two associated 
nests.  With 2 nests there is one nesting parameter; a 3-nest specification requires three 
parameters; and a 4-nest specification requires six parameters.  Because the number of 
nesting factors increases exponentially with the number of nests, a tractable simulation 
model probably should not have more than 3 or 4 nests.   
Assume that there are w nests, 2 ≤ w ≤ N, with each brand assigned to a nest.  The 
number of nesting parameters is w(w￿1)/2.  To summarize the nesting parameters, it is 





























                                                 
18 The calculations continue to assume an own-price elasticity of ￿3 for Brand 1 and an industry elasticity 
of ￿1.  It would be incorrect to scale the non-nested elasticities in the left-hand panel directly.  Nests affect 
the impact of adding-up, homogeneity, and symmetry and the appropriate calculation takes account of these 
constraints to generate economically consistent elasticities.    
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The matrix is symmetric.  Given a price increase for a brand in nest fi, the 
diversion of share to a brand nest fj deviates from proportionality by the nesting 
parameter 0 < Ω(ℑ(i), ℑ(j)) ≤ 1.  ℑ(k) is an indicator function that returns the nest 
containing brand k.  Proportionality is the special case where Ω(ℑ(i), ℑ(j)) = 100%.   
We illustrate a general calculation of bij with nesting parameters with the example 
used for Table 2.  There are two nests, so Ω contains a single sub-diagonal element ω1.  
We assume that Ω(ℑ(1), ℑ(2)) = ω1 and that Ω(ℑ(1), ℑ(3)) = 100%.  That is, brands 1 
and 3 are in a common nest and brand 2 is in a separate nest.  The share diversion for the 
price change for brand 1 can be expressed (imposing the adding-up condition) as  
 ￿ds1 + λ2s2/(1￿s1)ds1 + λ3s3/(1￿s1)ds1 = 0  (8) 
or, rewriting,  
  λ2s2/(1￿s1) + λ3s3/(1￿s1) = 1,  (9) 
 
where the λ￿s are share-diversion weights to be determined.  In the case of strict 
proportionality, λi = 100%.  The adjustment due to the deviation from proportionality in 
this example satisfies 
λ2 / λ3 = Ω(ℑ(1), ℑ(2)) / Ω(ℑ(1), ℑ(3)) = ω1. 
It follows from our prior assumption that λ2 = ω1λ3, and by substitution in equation (9), 
λ3 = (1￿s1)/(ω1s2 + s3).  Finally, equation (8) can be written as  
 ￿ds1 + ω1s2/(ω1s2 + s3)ds1 + s3/(ω1s2 + s3)ds1 = 0   
That is, b21 = ω1s2/(ω1s2 + s3)b11 and b31 = s3/(ω1s2 + s3)b11.  To evaluate these 
expressions substitute the shares (30%, 50%), b11 = ￿0.400 (unchanged from Table 1), 
and  ω1=0.5.  The results are 0.231 and 0.769, agreeing with the share diversion 
percentages that we calculated at the beginning of this section.   
C.  General Calibration of PCAIDS with Nests 
We generalize the determination of B with nests as follows.  Each element of B 
can be written as bik = θikbkk, where the θ￿s are known, but the diagonal elements bkk are 
unknown.  Impose adding-up and homogeneity.  The constraints imply a system of N￿1 
independent equations in the N unknown diagonal elements.  Without loss of generality,  
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normalize with respect to the first brand and define a vector β with N￿1 elements equal to 
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   (10) 
 
Equation (10) can be inverted to solve for the β vector.  B can therefore be specified 
entirely in terms of b11 and the θ￿s.  With known ε11 and ε, calibration is completed by 
using (5) to solve for the value for b11.  
 The  θ￿s are known functions of the market shares and the nesting parameters.  In 
general it can be shown that: 




i ik (m)) (k), (
(i)) (k), (
s
s θ  , i≠k. (11) 
With strict proportionality (i.e., a single nest that contains all of the brands), the nesting 
parameter equals 100% and equation (11) reduces to θik = ￿si/(1 ￿ sk).   
  We now show that the matrix B of PCAIDS coefficients is symmetric both under 
strict proportionality and with nests.  Since equation (10) has a unique solution, any 
feasible solution is also unique.  We try the symmetric solution for B and assume that bj1 



















β  (12) 
and from before, bjj = βjb11. 
  Equations (11) and (12) imply that  
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N ∑ = ℑ ℑ Ω
ℑ ℑ Ω
− = . (13) 
for i≠j.  Symmetry of B follows directly.  It can be shown that the bij from equation (13) 
satisfy adding-up and homogeneity.  They therefore comprise the unique solution to 
equation (10).  
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What remains is the problem of finding appropriate values for the nesting 
parameters.  A coarse grid on the parameters (e.g., 0.75, 0.50, and 0.25) is generally 
sufficient to assess the sensitivity of the simulation of different nests.  This is easy to 
carry out in the case of two nests but rapidly becomes unwieldy as the number of nests 
increases.   
 
III.  MARGINS AND NESTS IN PCAIDS 
In this section we show how margin data can be used to estimate nesting 
parameters.  Begin with the (￿FOCs￿) in the pre-transaction market:   
  s + diag(E1, E2, …, En)Sµ = 0  (14) 
Each firm may sell brands in different nests and every brand must be assigned to a 
nest.  As a theoretical matter, since proportionality is unlikely to hold exactly, each brand 
might be put in a separate nest.  However, as previously discussed, this strategy rapidly 
generates an intractable number of required parameters.  A priori information must be 
available to group brands more broadly.  To simplify the analysis, we aggregate the 
brands in the same nest for a given firm into a composite brand whose share is equal to 
the sum of the shares of the underlying brands.  That is, the number of different nests that 
a firm sells into equals the number of (possibly composite) brands that it produces. 
  Assume that firms 1 and 2 are the merger partners and that the margins are known 
for each of the brands they produce.  Each nest has either one or two margins associated 
with it; one margin if only one firm sells a brand in the nest, and two otherwise.  These 
data are likely to be available to the merger parties and to the appropriate enforcement 
agency.  To further simplify, assume also that no other margins are known and that the 
industry elasticity equals ￿1 (these assumptions are not essential to the results that 
follow).  From equations (5) and (12), it can be seen that the elasticity matrices Ei in the 
FOCs are functions of the margins, market shares (and industry elasticity), and the 
unknown nesting factors.   
The problem of determining nesting parameters amounts to finding values for 
them that generate E matrices that satisfy the FOCs with the pre-determined elements of 
the margin vector µ.  Because margins are only known for firms 1 and 2, the nesting  
  14
parameters depend only on the FOCs for the two merger partners (more generally, the 
parameters will depend on the FOC equations for the brands with the known margins).  
The structure of PCAIDS leads to a simple solution. 
  To simplify the notation, let the subscript ￿ denote the rows and columns in 
equation (14) that refer to the brands sold by the merging firms.  Then E￿ is the n1+n2 
transposed block-diagonal matrix of elasticities for firms 1 and 2, and B￿ is the 
corresponding n1+n2 block-diagonal matrix of coefficients from the B matrix of PCAIDS 
coefficients.  It is straightforward to show that E￿ = B￿S￿
￿1￿I, where I is the identity 
matrix with rank n1+n2.  Rewrite (14) as  
  S￿µ￿ = ￿E￿
￿1s￿  
where the expression just includes the shares for firms 1 and 2.  By substitution,  




  ( B￿S￿
￿1 ￿I￿)S￿µ￿ = ￿s￿. 
Rewriting,  
  B￿µ￿ = S￿ (µ￿ ￿ 1)  (15) 
where 1 is a column vector of 1￿s.  That is, the FOCs can be rewritten as a system of 
linear equations in the PCAIDS coefficients. 
  The next step is to express B￿ in terms of the nesting factors.  Using equations 
(12) and (13), it follows that  
   [ ] τ ω × ℑ ℑ Ω + − ⊗ ′ − = ∑ ≠ ⇑ ) )) ( ), ( ( ( ) (
i m m i m j s s diag I s s B  
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11
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Finally, rewrite (15) as 
[]
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b
m j s s
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× − = ℑ ℑ Ω + − ⊗ ′ − µ µ ω
 (16) 
This shows that the FOC￿s are also a linear function of the nest factors, conditional on 
knowledge of b11.  
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  The solution to (16) depends on the number of nests.  We begin with the cases 
that are likely to be most common and most tractable - either 2 or 3 nests.  With two nests 
(and two margins) there is an exact solution.  In this case, equation (16) reduces to a 
system of 2 equations in 2 unknowns, the single nesting parameter and the b11 coefficient.  
With three nests, (16) becomes a system of 3 equations in 4 unknowns, three nesting 
parameters, and the b11 coefficient.  The most convenient solution in this case is to solve 
(16) by setting an exogenous value for one of the nesting parameters.  A range of 
solutions is possible, depending on the selection of the exogenous parameter. 
This 3-nest system is underidentified.  However, (16) still places bounds on the 
solution because the nesting parameters must lie on the (0,1] interval.  Depending on the 
particular values of the key parameters, these bounds can be fairly tight, resulting in a set 
of simulations that are highly informative.  
  Now consider the possibility of overidentification.  When there are multiple 
margins for the same nest, estimates of nesting parameters are no longer unique.  The 2-
nest system will illustrate.  Suppose initially that firm 1 produces a single brand A11 and 
firm 2 produces a single brand B21.  A11 is in nest f1 and B21 is in nest f2.  This system has 
an exact solution.  Now suppose that firm 1 also produces a second brand A12 in nest f2.  
The system still has two nests, but f2 now has two brands available for the calibration.  
We believe it appropriate to use the additional margin information to evaluate the 
sensitivity of the merger simulation analysis to the specification of the demand model.   
To test the specification of the model, we propose that one calibrate (16) using 
only the A11 and B21 margins, while treating A12 as belonging to f2, but with an unknown 
margin.  The results would then be used to solve equation (14) for the implied remaining 
margins in the model.  This would yield a predicted value for the A12 margin.  A 
predicted margin that was close to the actual A12 margin would provide evidence that it 
was reasonable to place A12 in the same nest as B21 and the test would stop.   
If, however, the predicted and actual A12 margins were substantially different, we 
would reevaluate the original nesting assumptions.  One possibility is that it is more 
appropriate to place A12 in f1.  This could be tested by putting A12 in a new nest f3 with 
the constraints (using the notation in equation (7)) that ω2=100% and ω3=ω2).  In this 
case, equation (14) would be recalibrated using the new nest structure and the two  
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additional, pre-determined nesting parameters.  Solving (14) again for the new predicted 
A12 margin would now test whether the brand belongs in f1.  If the predicted and actual 
margins still diverged, this would be evidence that A12 should be placed in its own nest 
with independent nesting parameters. 
  Analogous considerations apply to the 3-nest system.   
 
IV.  MEASURING INCREMENTAL PROFIT MARGINS USING 
ACCOUNTING DATA 
 
The relevant profit margin to calibrate the model in principle should be based on 
the profit associated with an incremental increase in output, i.e., the difference between 
the incremental revenue and the incremental cost associated with the additional output.  
While seemingly straightforward, this information generally is not shown explicitly in the 
firm￿s financial statements, implying the need for further accounting and economic 
analysis.  For example, external reporting under Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) mandates expense categories that typically commingle fixed costs 
with variable costs.  In addition, certain costs of capacity should be treated as fixed in 
some circumstances but variable in others.  Finally, adjustments for common costs and 
joint products may be required for measuring net incremental costs for a single product of 
a multi-product firm. 
In particular, the gross margin (revenue minus cost of goods sold, or COGS) 
reported on a firm￿s income statement prepared under GAAP usually is not the relevant 
measure of the incremental profit margin.  The main issue is that COGS includes 
allocated fixed costs of production, such as rent and depreciation, which may not vary 
with output.  It also excludes variable sales, marketing, and administrative expenses (such 
as commissions and warranties).  If the firm￿s current production is at or near capacity 
(which can be limited by physical plant and equipment, personnel, and intangible assets 
such as quotas under licenses), then additional capacity would be required for the 
incremental production and the associated costs should be included in the profit margin 
calculation.   
Empirically, two approaches are typically used to determine incremental costs.  
The first approach relies on a regression analysis in which the dependent variable is total  
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operating costs and the independent variable is either quantity produced or sales revenue.  
The regression coefficient on the quantity variable provides an estimate of incremental 
cost.  The regression coefficient on the revenue variable is an estimate of 1 minus µ, 
where µ is the incremental profit margin percent.  Multiple regression analysis is also 
used, where the independent variables are various ￿cost drivers￿ (e.g., machine hours) 
that are correlated with output.
19  While potentially highly informative, regression 
analysis is subject to a variety of statistical pitfalls that can lead to unreliable estimation 
results.  It can also be misleading to extrapolate the results of a regression when cost 
effects due to capacity limits or multi-product production are relevant. 
The second accounting analysis approach involves identifying each line item in a 
firm￿s detailed, internal cost reporting system as either ￿fixed￿ or ￿variable.￿  This can be 
especially useful when the adjustments to COGS are reasonably straightforward, e.g., 
subtracting out depreciation or adding in sales commissions.  However, account analysis 
can entail subjective assumptions when the individual line items still combine fixed and 
variable components.  Account analysis can also become arbitrary in the case of multi-
product firms, where a variable cost item may have to be allocated across different 
product lines. 
Costs associated with the need for additional capacity are also likely to require 
separate analysis.  When capacity can be rented, market prices should be available to 
include in incremental cost.  If the firm must undertake additional investment, economic 
and financial analysis is required to determine the optimal scale of the investment and the 
associated capital charge.  That is, the capacity cost in this situation is incremental and 
needs to be amortized over the economic useful life of the investment. 
 
V.   EXAMPLES 
 
  To illustrate the ideas developed to this point we now discuss several different 
examples.  We begin with model calibration in the 3-firm market example described 
previously.  We then turn to a well-known analysis of the beer market published by 
                                                 
19 Horngren, Dukar, and Foster (2003).  
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Hausman, Leonard, and Zona (￿HLZ￿).  Our last example focuses on identification 
issues. 
A.  Calibration in a 3-firm market 
Recall that each of the 3 firms produces a single brand; the shares for the firms are 
20%, 30%, and 50%, respectively.  The industry elasticity is ￿1, and the merger partners 
are firms 1 and 2, with firm 1 having an incremental profit margin of 33.3%.  
Suppose first that all brands are assumed to belong in a single nest and that the 
simulation model is calibrated with the firm 1 margin.  PCAIDS generates an elasticity of 
￿2.75 for firm 2 (see Table 1), implying a corresponding margin of 36.4% (the negative 
reciprocal of the elasticity).  If the actual incremental profit margin were close to 36.4%, 
we would take this as support for the strict proportionality assumption and use of a single 
nest in the model.  Conversely, if the model were calibrated with the firm 2 margin, the 
resulting elasticity and margin for firm 1 would be ￿3 and 33.3%, respectively, which 
would also support the proportionality assumption. 
Suppose, however, that firm 2 had a profit margin of 48.1%.  This would suggest 
that firm 2 faces less competition than implied by proportionality.  We would infer that 
the model requires two nests, with firms 1 and 3 in the same nest and firm 2 in a separate 
nest.  The model is exactly identified because the two margins map into the two unknown 
parameters in equation (16).  The solution yields a nesting parameter equal to 0.5, since 
(see Table 2) this value for the nesting parameter results in an elasticity for firm 2 of ￿
2.08, which corresponds to the observed 48.1% margin. 
The decision as to how to group brands into nests is an important one.  Thus, firm 
2 could also have faced reduced competition if it were in the same nest as firm 3 and firm 
1 was in a separate nest.  Obviously, the nesting parameter, and the resulting elasticities 
in the model, can be sensitive to this choice.  Beyond the intuition just given, there is one 
additional helpful guide.  A nesting parameter must lie in the interval (0,1] to be 
economically meaningful.  In this case, the alternative nest structure can only satisfy the 
observed margins if the nesting parameter had the value 2.16, an extraneous solution that 
in our view rules out this nest from further consideration.  We conclude that the most 
appropriate model should use the nests in Table 2.  
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We believe it reasonable to utilize a principle of ￿maximum proportionality￿ as an 
additional model selection criterion that is relevant to the grouping problem.  When 
different nest structures are consistent with the margin data and have valid nesting 
parameters, we advise selecting the structure for which the length of a vector of 1￿s minus 
the vector of feasible nesting parameters is a minimum.  This metric yields a solution 
with a minimum deviation from strict proportionality.  In the case of a single parameter, 
for example, we would use the nests for which the parameter is closest to 1.0.  We view 
this as an application of Occam￿s razor, since proportionality has the virtue of 
simplicity.
20   
Grouping and maximum proportionality in this example are further illustrated in 
Table 3.  For each of the three possible configuration of nests, the table shows the ranges 
of feasible elasticities for firms 1 and 2.  More specifically, for each configuration we 
first hold the elasticity for firm 1 at ￿3 (the observed 33.3% margin) and solve for the 
minimum and maximum possible elasticities (and associated margins) for firm 2 obtained 
by varying the nesting parameter over (0,1].  We then hold the firm 2 elasticity at ￿2.75 
(implied by the firm 1 margin and strict proportionality) and similarly solve for the 
possible elasticity range for firm 1.  That is, each configuration ￿starts￿ with a nesting 
parameter of 1.0 and then maps the feasible deviations from strict proportionality that are 
consistent with the observed margins.  One of the main implications of Table 3 is that the 
various configurations of nests are able to accommodate an extremely wide range of 
margins. 
Suppose we are in the situation where firm 1 has a 33.3% margin and firm 2 has a 
48.1% margin.  Table 3 shows that the only feasible nest structure to attain the required 
elasticities of ￿3 and ￿2.08 is Configuration A (with implied nesting parameter equal to 
0.5).  The other two nest structures are not consistent with the margin data.  Suppose 
instead that firm 2 had an elasticity of ￿2.75 (36.4% margin), but that firm 1 had an 
elasticity of ￿1.5 (66.7% margin).  Then C is the only feasible solution (with a nesting 
                                                 
20 The assumption of ￿maximum proportionality￿ appears consistent with the views of 
other economists who specialize in merger analysis.  See Werden and Froeb (2002) p. 
14 who state, ￿Absent contrary evidence, substitution in proportion is often viewed as 
the most natural default assumption.  We share that view￿￿ and their cites to Willig 
(1991) and the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.   
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parameter equal to 0.19).  Finally, suppose the elasticities for firms 1 and 2 were ￿3.50 
and ￿2.75, respectively.  Configurations A and B both provide solutions, with nesting 
parameters 0.71 and 0.07, respectively.  By maximum proportionality, A is preferred.  A 
parameter of 0.07 suggests that firm 3 virtually does not compete with firms 1 or 2.  
Ideally, other information external to the model would also indicate that firm 3￿s brand 
was a reasonably good substitute for firms 1 and 2 to support an inference that 0.71 is 
reasonable and 0.07 is implausibly small. 
 
Table 3 
Nest Configurations and Feasible Elasticities 
for the Merging Firms 
 
  Firm 1 Margin = 33.3%  Firm 2 Margin = 36.4% 











A:  (1,3) ￿(2)  ￿1.02  ￿2.75  ￿3.00  ￿10.00 
B:  (1,2)￿(3)  ￿2.34  ￿2.75  ￿2.75  ￿3.60 
C:  (2,3)￿(1)  ￿2.75  ￿10.00  ￿1.02  ￿3.00 
Note: Only elasticities in the interval [￿10, ￿1) are included. 
 
B.  The Light Beer Market Revisited 
We first illustrate PCAIDS with nests by analyzing a model of retail demand for 
beer published by Hausman, Leonard, and Zona (￿HLZ￿).
21  We focus on the light beer 
segment that was estimated as part of a multi-stage budgeting model of a broader beer 
market.  HLZ used a panel of weekly store-level data to estimate demand for five 
different brands (Genesee Light, Coors Light, Old Milwaukee Light, Miller Lite, and 
Molson Light) using an AIDS model.  Their AIDS specification imposed symmetry and 
homogeneity, but was otherwise unrestricted.  Although HLZ did not report market 
                                                 
21 Hausman, Leonard, and Zona (1994).   
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shares for the brands, the estimation results contain sufficient information for us to infer 




Estimated Light Beer Market Shares 
Brand Share  (%) 
Genesee Lite  37.1 
Coors Light  25.7 
Old Milwaukee Light  11.4 
Miller Lite  15.9 
Molson Lite  9.9 
                 Total  100.0% 
 
We calibrate PCAIDS using HLZ￿s estimates of an unconditional price elasticity 
for Genesee of ￿3.763 and a light beer segment elasticity of ￿2.424.  These values imply 
b11 = ￿0.813.  The resulting PCAIDS coefficients with no nests (using equations (12) and 
(13) are: 
 
-0.813  0.332 0.148 0.206 0.127 
0.332  -0.665 0.102 0.143 0.088 
0.148 0.102  -0.353  0.063  0.039 
0.206 0.143  0.063  -0.467  0.055 
0.127  0.088 0.039 0.055 -0.309 
 
with implied elasticities: 
 
Table 5 
PCAIDS Elasticities (No Nests) 
Genesee  Light  -3.72  0.53 0.24 0.33 0.20 
Coors  Light  0.76  -3.95 0.24 0.33 0.20 
Old Milwaukee 
Light 0.76  0.53  -4.25  0.33  0.20 
Miller Lite  0.76  0.53  0.24  -4.16  0.20 
Molson  Light  0.76  0.53 0.24 0.33 -4.28 
 
                                                 
22 It appears that their data were for stores in upstate New York, which (at least several 
years ago) would account for the brands and relative shares.  
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As expected under strict proportionality, the cross-price elasticities in each column are 
identical.   
  Compare the PCAIDS elasticities to those estimated by HLZ: 
 
Table 6 
HLZ Light Beer Elasticities 
 
Genesee  Light  -3.76  0.46 0.40 0.25 0.20 
Coors  Light  0.57  -4.60 0.41 0.45 0.48 
Old Milwaukee Light  1.23  0.96  -6.10  0.84  0.57 
Miller Lite  0.51  0.74  0.59  -5.04  0.58 
Molson  Light  0.68  1.21 0.61 0.89 -5.84 
        
Ave. HLZ cross price 
elasticity  0.75  0.84 0.50 0.61 0.46 
 
The variation in the HLZ cross-price elasticities suggests that strict proportionality is not 
satisfied within a segment defined as these five brands.  (In contrast, HLZ￿s results 
support  proportionality much more strongly in their premium beer segment.)   
  Deviating from proportionality requires assumptions about nesting.  While beer 
lovers can debate what brands are the closest substitutes, HLZ suggest that Coors Light 
and Miller Lite are particularly close.  We put these brands in nest f1, along with Molson 
Light as another high quality, heavily advertised national brand.  We find it plausible that 
Old Milwaukee Light occupies a middle ground between those three brands and Genesee 
Light, a regional label that is not without its charms.  Accordingly, we put them in 
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These parameters imply that f2 is ￿equally far￿ from f1 and f3, and that f3 is relatively 
farther from f1. 
Recalibrating PCAIDS with these additional parameters results in the following 
matrix of elasticities:  
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Table 7 
PCAIDS Elasticities (3 Nests) 
Genesee Light  -3.76 0.48 0.40 0.30 0.18 
Coors Light  0.69 -4.82 0.40 0.82 0.51 
Old Milwaukee Light  1.30 0.90 -5.50 0.56 0.35 
Miller Lite  0.69 1.32 0.40 -5.32 0.51 
Molson Light  0.69 1.32 0.40 0.82 -5.63 
       
Average PCAIDS cross-price 
elasticity with nests  0.85 1.01 0.40 0.62 0.39 
 
The three nesting parameters bring the PCAIDS elasticities quite close to the unrestricted 
HLZ results.  We might view them as analogous to a ￿sufficient statistic￿ for the demand 
system.  That is, it appears that the four PCAIDS parameters (b11 and three nesting 
parameters) contain essentially the same information as the 25 coefficients estimated by 
HLZ. 
C.  Calibration in a 3-Nest System 
Suppose there are five firms in the market, the merger partners (A, B) plus three 
competitors.  Firm A sells two brands.  The other firms sell one brand.  There are three 
nests (Popular, Budget, and Prestige).  Collectively, firms A and B sell into all three 
nests.  In the absence of nests, we would calibrate the PCAIDS model if we knew one 
brand elasticity.  Now, however, we have the case of 3 FOC equations (for the 3 brands 
produced by the merger partners) and 4 unknowns (b11 and the three nesting parameters).  
The shares and nests in the market are as follows: 
 
Table 8 
Shares in a 3 Nest Market 
Firm-Brand Share  (%)  Nest 
A-1 10.0  Popular 
A-2 7.5  Prestige 
B 12.5  Budget  
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C 15.0  Popular 
D 25.0  Budget 
E 30.0  Popular 
                 Total  100.0   
 




  Suppose the margins for brands  A-1, A-2, and B are 40.0%, 55.0%, and 45.0%, 
respectively, and the overall market demand elasticity is ￿1.0.  We use the solution 
method outlined above that sets one of the nesting parameters exogenously.  First, we test 
whether the 3 nests can be reduced to 2 nests.  This is done by solving equation (16) three 
times, each time fixing a different ωi at 100%.  We found that in no case was there a 
feasible solution.  That is, each solution to equation (16) with ωi =100% required at least 
one nesting parameter outside (0,1] to satisfy the FOCs.  This is an important piece of 
information that supports the necessity of using a model specification with at least three 
nests.   
We next find the range of feasible solutions for equation (16) by using a coarse 
grid to set ω3 exogenously.  We found that a value of approximately 0.75 was the highest 
value for ω3 that permitted a feasible solution.  We then solved equation (16) using the 
grid (.75, .50, .25, and .01).  Each exogenous value for ω3 implies corresponding unique 
values for ω1 and ω2.  Table 9 reports the range of solutions.   
 
Table 9 










0.03 0.24  0.75 
0.24 0.30  0.50 
0.46 0.36  0.25  
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0.66 0.41  0.01 
 
The results show a fairly tight range for ω2, the Budget￿Popular nesting 
parameter, centered at approximately 0.32.  The other two parameters move inversely.  If 
there is evidence that both Popular and Budget are substitutable for Prestige, then the 
parameters close to 0 may be ruled out as solutions.  That is, we could exclude the 
solutions where ω3 = 0.75 or ω3 = 0.01.  On this basis, Table 8 suggests that a reasonable 
solution is to assume that all nest factors are in the range 0.25 to 0.50.  This is likely to 
offer sufficient precision for the nest factors in many cases.  Alternatively, the principle 
of maximum proportionality generates a solution vector of approximately (0.37, 0.34, 
0.35), a similar result.    
 
Scenario 2 
  Suppose the margins are 40.0%, 35.0%, and 35.0%.  In this case, there is no 
feasible solution for any set of nesting factors in the (0,1] range.  There are several 
possible explanations.  First, the margins may not have been measured or reported 
accurately.  It is possible, of course, that firms are not Bertrand pricers, or that markets 
are not in equilibrium.  A second possibility ￿ the one that we find the most intriguing -- 
is that the assignment of the brands to the nests was not reasonable.  For example, there is 
a feasible solution if C is moved from Popular to Prestige.  This suggests that using 
margin data with PCAIDS can offer a useful methodology for model specification 
purposes. 
 
Scenario 3  
  Finally, suppose the margins are 40.0% for all three brands.  There is a feasible 












0.76 0.71  1.00 
1.00 0.80  0.80 
 
The nest factors are not identified, but are nevertheless estimated with a high level of 
precision.  
   
VI.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We believe that the direct use of brand-margin data to estimate the parameters of 
demand systems offers a fruitful empirical basis for merger simulation analysis.  We have 
shown, within the PCAIDS framework, that the margins serve to calibrate empirically the 
nest structure (groups of products that are particularly close substitutes) and generalize 
the analysis of own- and cross-price elasticities.  PCAIDS in its basic formulation relies 
on an assumption of ￿proportionality￿ which greatly reduces the number of free 
parameters but constrains all cross-price elasticities corresponding to a given price 
change to be equal.  By incorporating nests, however, PCAIDS can relax the 
proportionality constraint and more closely approximate an unconstrained AIDS model.  
This modeling strategy exploits information that is likely to be available in the 
typical merger investigation (at least for the merging parties), but that has not been 
integrated into existing econometric models used for merger simulation.  In some cases, 
the nesting parameters will be exactly identified.  In other cases, they will be 
underidentified, but simulated price effects can be still bounded.  In still other cases, the 
nesting parameters will be overidentified, which permits an analysis of the robustness of 
the underlying demand specification.   
PCAIDS may be especially appealing for mergers at the wholesale level (where 
scanner data do not exist) and for geographic markets that span national borders (where 
comparable data are often difficult to gather).  Available brand margin data, market  
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shares, and an estimate of the market demand elasticity should be sufficient to make 
PCAIDS feasible in such cases.  In contrast, it may be difficult or even impossible to 
implement more data-intensive methodologies that rely on the econometric estimation of 
demand systems.  Some of the areas for continued work include: how does PCAIDS 
compare in practice and in theory to a logit model with nests?  to a multi-stage AIDS 
model?  What are the most appropriate procedures for testing and evaluating the 
robustness of the PCAIDS results to the choice of nesting parameters?   These and other 
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